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NOTES

THE RISK ASSESSMENT AND COST BENEFIT ACT
OF 1995: REGULATORY REFORM AND THE
LEGISLATION OF SCIENCE
In 1995, a new Republican majority swept into power in the 104th Congress, due
in part to its promise to redefine and reduce the power of the federal government. As
part of its proclaimed Contract with America, the Republican majority promised to
increase job growth by reducing the burdens and barriers which government places on
American businesses. Among the reforms proposed for governmental regulation is a
requirement that all federal agencies assess the risks and costs associated with imposed
regulations.' A major target of this reform is the massive and complex system of environmental statutes and regulations which has evolved over the last three decades.2
Following the growth of the environmental movement in the 1960s, Congress
enacted a broad range of environmental statutes to address its concerns. Statutes and
regulations were promulgated to protect clean air and water, to preserve endangered
species and habitats, to regulate the manufacture, transportation, sale, use, and disposal
of hazardous materials, and to clean up contaminated sites. The statutes form a broad
and interrelated network which, over the past 35 years, have impacted almost every
facet of our lives and economic activities.3 Few rational observers would deny that
these laws have had some very beneficial effects. Environmental efforts have achieved
dramatic successes in some areas, such as the restoration of water quality in the Great
Lakes.4 Even in areas which have failed to improve, such as air quality in some urban
regions, the problem is surely less than it would have been without the mandated reductions in auto emissions.5
The complex and pervasive regulations have also entailed costs, in terms of
higher consumer prices, expansion of government bureaucracy, shrinkage of jobs in
some areas of the economy, and limits on freedom of action. These substantial costs,
when compared to benefits that are sometimes obscure and difficult to quantify, have
led many to question whether our approach to environmental regulation has been the
correct one.6 Even prior to the current debate in Congress, lawmakers, regulatory

1. CoNTRAcT wrTH AMERICA 132 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
2. David Clarke, A Contract Without Green Ink ENvTL. F., JanJFeb. 1995, at 30, 32.
3. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1994), at viii tbls.l-2, for an indication of
the exponential increase in the number of domestic environmental laws and international environmental
treaties.
4. 1990 COUNCIL ON ENvTL. QUALITY, TWENTmTH ANN. REPORT 331.
5. Id. at 8-9.
6. However, the evidence that environmental regulation has been economically damaging or ruinous to individual companies has frequently been anecdotal. Environmental proponents claim that independent and rigorous economic analyses of the effects of environmental regulation show that they have
had little effect on both national and state economies. Stephen M. Meyer, The Economic Impact of
Environmental Regulation, J. ENVTL. L. & PRAc., SeptJOct. 1995, at 4, 4.
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agencies, and practitioners have devoted a great deal of attention to the principles
underlying environmental and health regulation, and have been rethinking what our
fundamental approach to regulation should be. Out of this process have come proposals
for a restructuring of the regulatory system along different lines.
Several changes in the approach to environmental regulation have been proposed
in the Congress, including rewriting major laws, reducing budgets of environmental
agencies, and nullifying specific regulations.' As a more general overall regulatory reform, bills have been proposed which will require the regulatory bodies to base their
actions on reasonable considerations of risks and benefits to human health and safety,
and to ensure the scientific soundness of risk assessments and risk management decisions which the agencies undertake. If enacted, these proposals will push risk assessment and risk management techniques to the forefront of environmental policy.
Part I of this note will briefly explore some of the major statutes that have been
enacted in the regulatory explosion of the last 35 years and the different approaches
they have taken in the protection of human health and safety, including traditional
command-and-control regulation, the application of cost-benefit tradeoffs, and the
development of economic approaches. Part II will look at some of the results of these
approaches which some in Congress find to be unreasonable or misguided when
viewed from a risk assessment framework. Part IUl will describe the methodologies
which characterize the current state of the art in risk assessment and risk management
techniques, and some of the shortcomings and problems, both scientific and political,
in applying these techniques to environmental and safety issues. An example of the
application of these methodologies in a particular area of environmental regulation,
involving the banning of the pesticide ethylene dibromide, will illustrate some of the
benefits, as well as the problems, which can result. Part IV will analyze the congressional proposals embodied in The Comprehensive Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit
Act of 19958 for expanding the use of risk assessment and risk management in regulatory decision-making. Part V will attempt to analyze how these proposals, if enacted,
will affect the functioning of regulatory agencies and the structure of our complex
environmental regulatory apparatus. Finally, Part VI will discuss some of the scientific
and policy problems which these proposals entail.
I. BACKGROUND IN SIGNIFICANT REGULATION
Governments have long relied on legislation to protect human health and safety
from environmental threats.9 The statutory approach preceded the common law doc-

7. Dale E. Brooks & Sean D. Bersell, The Climate for Change in Environmental Policy, ENVTL.
PROGRESS, Nov. 1995, at N5, N5.
8. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. (1995). This language was also incorporated into the Job Creation
and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, H.R. 9, 104th Cong. H.R. 1022 passed the House on February
28, 1995, and H.R. 9 passed the House on March 3, 1995. Both bills were referred to the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee.
A similar bill, the Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 104th Cong., was
introduced and debated in the Senate, but was not brought to a vote. Dale E. Brooks and Sean
Bersell, Congress and the Environment: 1995 in Review, ENvTL. PROGRESS, Spring 1996, at S7, S8.
9. Statutes to protect water quality date from the fourteenth century reign of Richard II. Statute
12 Rich. 2, ch. 13 (1388) (Eng.), prohibited the disposal of filth or garbage into rivers or waterways
near a town. A.S. WIsDOM, THE LAW OF THE POLLUTION OF WATERS 3 (1957). Concerning air pollution, a sixteenth century proclamation of Queen Elizabeth I prohibited the burning of sea coal in
London during sessions of Parliament. J.F. GARNER & R.S. OFFORD, THE LAW ON THE POLLUTION OF
THE AIR AND THE PRACTICE OF ITS PREVENTION 3 (1957).
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trines of private and public nuisance which began to take shape in sixteenth century
England,"° and which became the predominant approaches to environmental protection
for many years. However, as is true with modem protection efforts, all of these approaches tended to be piecemeal and reactive in nature. With limited exceptions, they
were unable to cope effectively with the ravages which the industrial revolution
wrought upon human populations and the environment." Their failure was due in part
to the limitations of our notions of property and the common nature of environmental
resources.12 In addition, the sheer volume of human activity as populations have increased exponentially and the increase in per capita consumption in industrialized
nations have contributed to this failure.' 3
In the late nineteenth century, the scientific study of man in relation to his environment began in Europe with the founding of the ecology movement. The original
movement comprised principles of both science and philosophy, including the concepts
of limited natural resources and the holistic interrelationship of man with nature. 4
These ideals were influential in the environmental movement which began to flourish
in the United States in the 1960s when many scientists became concerned with the
effects of pollution on public health and ecological systems and communicated their
concerns to the public. The overwhelming public response to these perceived threats
moved environmentalism from a fringe doctrine to a mainstream social and political
force. 5
A. Command and Control Regulation
The initial, and so far dominant, approach to environmental and health regulation
has been that of command-and-control. Characteristics of this approach are a nationwide system of uniform, technology-based standards and controls, with deadlines for
compliance, and which place health and safety concerns above economic considerations. " Such standards tend to be complex and rigid. However, flexibility can still be
implemented in this approach by allowing regulatory discretion in setting deadlines and
issuing variances.
The modern Clean Water Act (originally the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
of 1972," or FWPCA) and Clean Air Act of 1970" (CAA) embody this approach

10. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 113.
11.

See generally ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 74-102 (1992) (dis-

cussing the shortcomings of public and private nuisance actions in environmental protection).
12. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCi. 1243, 1245 (1968).
13. AMEICA'S CHANGING ENVIRONMENT, at xi (Roger Revelle & Hans H. Landsberg eds., 1970)
("One [cause of degradation of our surroundings] is undoubtedly rapid population growth, but a good
case can be made that two other important villains are the increase in Gross National Product and the
changing patterns of our lives.").
14. Michael M. Gemmell and Jay H. Lehr, Ecology's Ancestry, THE FREE-MARKET ENVIRONMENTALIST, Dec. 1990, reprinted in RATIONAL READINGS ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 6, 7 (Jay H.
Lehr ed., 1992) [hereinafter RATIONAL READINGS].
15. PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 2.
16. These technology-based standards are often designed to be technology-forcing by setting more
demanding standards than can be achieved by current technology, thus forcing industries to invest in
technological development and innovation. See PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 167. Such technology-forc-

ing implies a certain measure of cost-benefit assessment since a polluter must weigh the expense of
implementing the technology to achieve a possible limit against the alternative of ceasing operations
and forgoing profits.
17. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
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with differing strategies. FWPCA relies on performance and emissions standards which
are applied with industry-wide uniformity. 9 The standards applied under FWPCA include both limitations of pollutant levels at point sources of emission ("end-of-pipe"
regulations) and ambient water quality goals for the receiving water systems.' The
statute and its following amendments rely heavily on the concept of "best technology,"
requiring that limits on emissions be at least as good as what the "best technology"
can achieve." The CAA relies more heavily on ambient standards and implements
them in more localized attainment zones.'
While pollution prevention undeniably adds to the health and well-being of society, some statutes have focused more directly on protecting human health and safety
rather than the environment per se. In spite of this more directed focus, these acts have
not escaped the attention of the regulatory reformers. Increased concern for the health
and safety of working people led to the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 197023 (OSHA). While not truly an environmental statute, it has had similar
impacts on regulated industries and has been as much criticized. OSHA mandates that
each employer shall "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards. . . ."' It is very much in the
tradition of command-and control regulation, as it requires that each employer "comply
with occupational safety and health standards and all rules, regulations, and orders ...
which are applicable to his own actions and conduct."' Under OSHA, while safety
standards are subject to a cost-benefit analysis, health standards are not. OSHA needs
to show merely that a proposed health standard is technologically feasible and that it
will not economically destroy the industry.26
Possibly one of the most rigid command-and-control regulations of all is the
Endangered Species Act of 197327 (ESA), which effectively prohibits activities which
lead to the loss of biodiversity without regard to economic considerations.28 In pass-

19. PERCIvAL, supra note 11, at 880.
20. ROBERT W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 256 (1991).
21. "Best technology" may take on different connotations for different types of sources or facilities. Under FWPCA, for instance, "best practicable technology" (BPT) was required for all point sources as an interim standard, with "best available technology" (BAT) standards, which are more stringent,
to be achieved by the 1983 deadline. Id. at 256-57. The 1977 amendments to the Act (renamed the
Clean Water Act or CWA) further divided pollutants into toxic, conventional, and non-conventional
pollutants, and adopted a new standard of "best conventional technology" (BCT) for the conventional
category. Id. at 257-58. While the BCT standard allowed for consideration of "economical
'reasonableness"' in setting limitations, the BAT standards were to be based on protection of public
health and the provision of an "'ample margin of safety,"' without consideration of economic feasibility. Id (quoting FWPCA § 307(a)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(4)). New or modified sources are generally
subject to the stricter standards. Id. at 257.
22. PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 768-69.
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1994).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1994).
26. David G. Sarvadi, Workplace Health and Safety Regulation After 25 Years, J.ENVTL. L. &
PRAC., May/June 1995, at 24, 29.
27. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
28. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) ("The plain intent of Congress in
enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.").
Congress subsequently relaxed the strictures of the ESA by creating an Endangered Species
Committee to consider exemptions and reasonable alternatives that are in the public interest. See
FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 20, at 84. However, it continues to be a powerful and controversial
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ing this statute, Congress seemed to be recognizing both the urgency of providing
protection to species on the verge of extinction, and the difficulty in quantifying the
benefits of preserving biodiversity.29 The influence of strict ecology principles in this
statute is readily apparent.
B. Cost-Benefit Regulation
The use of cost-benefit analysis, while not predominant, was embodied in many
early environmental statutes. The most important is the National Environmental Policy
Act of 196930 (NEPA). It directs agencies of the U.S. Government to give "appropriate consideration" to environmental values as well as economic and technical considerations in planning and decision-making.3 In contrast to the complex and detailed substantive regulations of the FWPCA and CAA, NEPA is written in terms of general
policy goals and is essentially procedural. It has been construed to require the consideration of the environmental risks associated with all reasonable alternatives in a decision-making process. 2 NEPA also sought to improve the scientific underpinnings of
environmental policy by establishing a Science Advisory Board33 (SAB) to review research and regulations promulgated under various statutes. The Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS), the methodology which NEPA mandates to accomplish its policy
goals, has proved so successful that it has been widely emulated in the environmental
laws of other nations.' While formal cost-benefit analysis is not a requirement of an
EIS, and is even discouraged when important benefits cannot be quantified," the decision-making process which the EIS embodies has been called "the closest thing to a
generic cost-benefit rule found in U.S. domestic law."'
Another statute aimed directly at protecting public health and safety is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act37 (FIFRA). This is a balancing type of
regulation, employing a cost-benefit approach. It bases registration of pesticides for
sale and use on the finding that they pose no "unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of
the use . . . ."" The Toxic Substances Control Act39 of 1976 (TSCA) applies similar

statute. See Tom Abate, A Threatened Statute, ENvTL. F., MarJApr. 1992, at 16, 17-18.
29. In the Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a), Congress stated its findings that "(2) . . . [S]pecies . . . have been so depleted in numbers that they are in danger of or
threatened with extinction;" and "(3) these species . . . are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historic,
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation[.]"
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B) (1994).
32. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4365(a) (1994).
34. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 810. The concept of environmental impact assessment has also
taken root in international conventions and declarations concerning global environmental protection. See,
e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT

AND

DEVELOPMENT,

Rio DECLARATION ON

ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, Principle 17, U.N. Doc. A/C.151/26 (Vol. 1) (1992), revised by
U.N. Doc. A/C.151/51 Rev. 1 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992); Protocol on Environmental Protection to
the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, Art. 8, 30 I.L.M. 1461 (1991).
35. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (1995).
36. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 811.
37. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994), (originally the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of
1972).
38. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1994), amended by Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-170, §§ 230(a), 304, 110 Stat. 1489, 1508-12 (1996).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).

Journalof Legislation

[Vol. 23:61

criteria to the regulation of the manufacture of toxic chemicals, requiring the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to consider both the benefits and risks of a chemical
in formulating its regulations. 4°
C. Economic Approaches
A later development, intended to overcome the rigidity and economic inefficiency of the command-and-control approach, was the introduction of incentive-based
regulation. This approach uses market forces to encourage reductions in pollution by
making it more expensive for polluters to continue to discharge. This approach had
been considered early in the development of environmental law, with discussions taking place as early as 1965 concerning pollution taxes.4' Little progress in this area
took place, however, until the EPA, forced by non-attainment of air quality standards
in many areas, developed an offset program to enable the issuance of new source
permits in these areas.4 Congress adopted this approach legislatively in the 1977
CAA amendments.43
The offsets allow a polluter to obtain a permit for a new emissions source in a
non-attainment area if it can obtain offsetting emissions reductions from other sources
in the same area." The program encouraged the trading of offsets, so that the polluter
with the greatest economic incentive could purchase the right to operate a new
source.4 5 In support of this approach, the EPA believed that the early command-andcontrol and cost-benefit regulations had been successful in forcing technology and
providing rapid progress, but that future regulation should focus more closely on economic efficiency." Congress adopted a similar approach in the emissions allocation
and transfer allowances dealing with acid rain, enacted in the 1990 CAA amendments.47 However, opposition to further expansion of the economic incentive approach
has come from both environmental groups and industry.48
A more burdensome economic approach, the "polluter pays" principle, is at the
heart of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

40. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) (1994) provides:
In promulgating any rule . . . with respect to a chemical substance or mixture, the Administrator shall consider and publish a statement with respect to(A) The effects of such substance or mixture on health and the magnitude of the
exposure of human beings to such substance or mixture,
(B) The effects of such substance or mixture on the environment and the magnitude of the exposure of the environment to such substance or mixture,
(C) The benefits of such substance or mixture for various uses and the availability
of substitutes for such uses, and
(D) The reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after consideration of the effect on the national economy, small business, technological innovation,
the environment, and public health.
41. PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 173.
42. Id. at 174.
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7505 (1994).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A) (1994).
45. PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 174.
46. Id. (citing Status of the Programs and Policies of the Environmental protection Agency,
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm on Public Works, 95th
Cong. 9 (1977) (remarks of Russell Train, Administrator, USEPA)).
47. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7651-7651o (1994).
48. See PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 176.
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Act 9 (CERCLA or the Superfund Act), a massive environmental statute designed to
repair the effects of past pollution. Its purpose is to designate responsibility for cleanup
of severely contaminated sites, implement cleanup programs, and assess liability for
the cost of cleanup on parties which are potentially responsible for the environmental
damage.r Under CERCLA, when the government discovers that a release of contaminants or pollutants has taken place or is imminent, it may undertake the cleanup itself
and assess liability on responsible parties." The Act also allows responsible parties
which have undertaken a cleanup to recover costs from other responsible parties.52
With its strict and broad-based liability, CERCLA has many similarities to the
command-and-control approach.53 At the same time, its site assessment provisions for
remedial actions incorporate many of the features of risk analysis. It requires the government, before carrying out a remedial action under § 9604, to "conduct an assessment of permanent solutions and alternative treatment methodologies[,]" which takes
into account, among other things, "the persistence, toxicity, mobility, and propensity to
bioaccumulate of such hazardous substances and their constituents; ... [the] short- and
long-term potential for adverse health effects from human exposure; ... [and] longterm maintenance costs. . . ."' Recently, the EPA has expanded the scope of risk assessments at Superfund sites to go beyond the risk to human health and to include
assessment of ecological risk, such as toxic harm to the environment.5
D. Comparison of Regulatory Approaches
Common themes among the proponents of the command-and-control approach
are that environmental quality is a public good for its own sake, and that government
is most effective as a regulator in an arm's-length or even adversarial relationship with
the regulated entities. The initial attraction to the command-and-control approach lay in
the belief that uniform, technology-based standards would be easiest for regulators to
develop and monitor.56 The EPA viewed this approach as a way of focusing the efforts of industry and forcing rapid progress in environmental compliance at the cost of
some efficiency."'
Some critics of coercive regulation, however, perceived this approach as having
inevitably grown out of the philosophical roots of the ecology movement. In their
view, the holistic concept of man's relationship with nature creates an anti-industry bias

49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
50. Potentially responsible parties include current owners and operators of contaminated sites,
persons who were owners or operators at the time hazardous substances were disposed of at the site,
persons who arranged for transportation or disposal of the substances, and persons who accepted the
substances for transportation or disposal. PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 290-91.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1994).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1994).
53. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613, instituted goals and deadlines to force action on cleanup of listed hazardous waste
dumps, similar to the approaches of the early command-and control statutes. SARA also incorporated
stricter state standards in states which have more severe standards than the federal government, and it
increased civil and criminal penalties for Superfund violations. Charles Davis, Approaches to the Regulation of Hazardous Waste, 18 ENvTL. L. 505, 512 (1988).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (1994).
55. Cris Williams, Using Ecological Risk Assessment Methods, ENvTL. PROTECION, Jan. 1994, at
92, 93.
56. PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 161.
57. Id. at 173.
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which, coupled with the distributional problem of limited resources, favors a forced
solution to the pollution problem."
The command-and-control approach has been subject to other criticisms as well.
Opponents of technology-based limitations charge that they, in effect, prescribe the use
of particular technologies in complying with limitations, and that this inhibits innovation by not providing any incentive for developing more effective technologies.59 Industrial targets of regulation claim that the uniformity in the regulations and lack of
flexibility to individualize them for specific applications cause a great waste of resources in compliance efforts.' They also emphasize the lack of realistic priorities
and economic efficiency." While industry projections of the cost of compliance with
regulations have generally proved to be greatly exaggerated,"2 these criticisms have
brought a great deal of pressure for legislation and regulations which respond more
favorably to economic concerns.
While the cost-benefit types of statutes still maintain an arm's-length relationship
between the regulatory agencies and the regulated entities, they are less adversarial in
nature than the command-and-control approach. They allow for more input from the
regulated entities into the process, and allow the regulatory bodies wider latitude on
issues of reasonableness and feasibility. They also depart further from the principles of
the ecology movement by lessening the importance of environmental quality as an end
in itself, and treating it more as a means to promote public health and safety.
The approach embodied in the cost-benefit type of statutes involves obvious
difficulty in quantifying some environmental benefits. The history of environmental
regulation indicates that traditional economic analysis has "systematically undervalued
natural resources." 63 It has also been criticized as "single purpose planning"' which
subordinates important environmental values to economic considerations. This last
criticism may be less valid with NEPA due to the broad range of alternatives which
the statute forces the regulatory bodies to consider. It is more valid with FIFRA and
TSCA, but even here the regulators may be allowed discretion to consider other values
by defining what is an "environmental cost" or a "reasonable risk" to the environment.5 However, to the extent this discretion is implemented, the regulations will

58. See Gemmell & Lehr, supra note 14, at 11. The article is strident in tone, comparing the
ecology movement to the rise of German Nazism without providing any foundation for the comparison.
However, the connection between the principles of the ecology movement and command-and-control
regulation is a logical one. The theme that the problem of limited resources requires a coercive solution is also sounded by Hardin, supra note 12, at 1248.
59. The argument is that by prescribing specific technologies to be used which are already in existence, a company has no incentive to search for a more effective means of control unless it will be
cheaper. PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 166.
60. Bruce Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for
Market Incentives, 13 CoLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 171, 173 (1988).
61. Id. at 174-75.
62. PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 167.
63. SCIENCE ADVISORY BD., U.S. EPA, REDUCING RISK: SETING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990), quoted in Robert F. Blomquist, The EPA Science Advisory
Board's Report on "Reducing Risk": Some Overarching Observations Regarding the Public Interest, 22
ENvTL. L. 149, 162 (1992).
64. Harold Gilliam, The Fallacy of Single Purpose Planning, in REvELLE & LANDSBERG, supra
note 13, at 67, 68.
65. For example, EPA procedures require mitigative measures to be taken, such as limiting application areas, if use of a pesticide jeopardizes an endangered species listed under ESA. U.S. EPA Standard Operating Procedure No. 3065.1.
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retain some of the characteristics of the command-and-control approach which led to
the original inefficiency. As political pressures grow to increase the reliance on costbenefit balancing and improve the economic efficiency of regulation, the danger may
arise that too little consideration will be given to the broader range of environmental
values.
The economic incentive approach to regulation embodied in the offsets programs
represents closer cooperation between government and industry than either the command-and-control or the cost-benefit approach. Proposals to broaden this type of regulation include the assessment of charges on polluting activities,' the establishment of
a market in emissions rights similar to the offsets program,' and subsidies, such as.
tax incentives, for emissions reductions or the installation of pollution control equipment. 8 Their unifying theme is that they would improve the economic efficiency of
regulation by directing the resources employed in reducing pollution to the applications
in which they are most economically valuable.
This approach also departs further from the ideals of the ecology movement by
treating clean air and water as tradeable commodities. The proponents of ecological
values see these types of regulations as providing licenses to pollute, and as allowing
disparate impacts on different areas by permitting higher emissions in areas where
reduction costs would be greater.' Beside the basic criticism that market-based incentives may not be entirely effective due to market imperfections," other criticisms
have been raised. Some industry representatives oppose such measures because they
would reallocate existing emissions rights, creating losers as well as winners. There are
further questions as to whether such regulations would be any easier for regulatory
bodies to administer than the present approaches.7 '
The present web of environmental laws represents the interaction, conflict and
accommodation of different value systems, social goals, and pecuniary interests of the
various stakeholders in the regulatory process. So far, no single approach has provided
either a totally effective or mutually acceptable solution to the environmental problem,
but questions remain as to whether the best approach has been applied in each given
situation, and whether a more unified overall approach would lead to greater success.

66. CHARLES L. SCHULTZE Er AL., SETTING PRIORITm5: THE 1973 NATIONAL BUDGET (1972), in
FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 20, at 348.
The only "federally imposed pollution tax" so far is the excise tax imposed on
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) as part of the effort to phase out their manufacture. It may have been
enacted as much for revenue production as for its environmental incentive function. See Paul Scodari,
Time to Rebuild the Structure, ENV'L. F., MarJApr. 1991, at 18, 19-20.
67. EDWARD I. SELIG, EFFLUENT CHARGES ON AIR AND WATER POLLUTION: A CONFERENCE REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON LAW RELATED STUDIES (1973), in FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 20, at
358.
68. PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 151.
69. Id. at 176.
70. For criticism of the incentive-based approach and support for the command-and-control approach, see Sam Hays, Emissions Trading Mythology, ENviL. F., JanJFeb. 1995, at 14, 20 ("The biologists and geologists are looking for real reductions in emissions and the engineers are offering ways
to bring them about. The economists offer cost and income choices that bear only an indirect and
often fuzzy relationship with the real world of ecological circumstance.").
71. PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 176.
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II. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS GIVING RISE TO THE NEED FOR
REGULATORY REFORM
The current state of environmental regulation has led to regulatory decisions and
allocation of resources which many find irrational and difficult to understand. Apart
from the tremendous cost and complexity, the criticism that has been gaining the most
force recently is that our present approach does not set priorities in terms of actual risk
to human health or environmental quality, or in terms of the actual benefits produced
by a regulation in relation to the expenditure of resources that its implementation requires."'
The clamor against present regulatory priorities has grown in response to certain
specific examples of the effects of regulation. Among the most highly criticized actions
have been cleanup enforcements under the Superfund Act. These actions receive a high
profile, both because they often involve a very high cost, and because the Superfund
Act is essentially a "no-fault" program which may assess liability regardless of actual
responsibility for the contaminated site.73 However fair or unfair the provisions of
Superfund may be on assessing liability, the valid criticism from the risk assessment
perspective is that the costs of mandated cleanups are out of all proportion to the actual risk which the sites present to human health.74
Another cited instance of regulatory irrationality is the ban on the chemical pesticide and soil fumigant ethylene dibromide (EDB). Use of this chemical was banned
when minute residues began to show up in food products.75 However, many naturally
occurring substances in ordinary food products create greater dietary risks than those
posed by the EDB residues which led to its ban.76 Such examples fuel the notion that
resources are being wasted by addressing risks that are small, while greater risks are
ignored.
A third example involving the growth regulator Alar exemplifies the influence of
media attention on risk perception. Critics charge that a media "campaign" greatly
overstated the risk from this relatively harmless chemical, and led to an unjustified ban
in 1989."7 The media concentrated its coverage on environmental groups which had
an interest in pushing for the ban, and ignored the recommendations of responsible
scientists, Congress, the EPA, and the agricultural industry. The distorted public
perception which resulted from the media coverage led to a ban which ultimately cost

72. Scodari, supra note 66, at 22.
73. Alfred R. Light, Doja Vu All Over Again? A Memoir of Superfund Past, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENv'T., Fall 1995, at 29, 32.
74. In United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990), the EPA sought to enforce a $9.3 million cleanup to reduce PCB levels from 50 p.p.m. to 20 p.p.m., which was "a very
high cost for very little extra safety." Id. at 441. Congressional critics point to this as the type of
Superfund litigation which cries out for regulatory reform. 141 CONG. REC. H2256 (daily ed. Feb. 27,
1995) (remarks of Rep. Rohrabacher).
75. See infra text accompanying notes 133-46 for a description of the regulatory response which
led to the banning of EDB.
76. For example, the dietary risk from the levels of the naturally occurring substance aflatoxin
that are found in peanut butter is 75 times greater than the risk which led to the EDB ban. 141
CONG. REC. H2278 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Roberts).
77. Jane S. Shaw, Is Environmental Press Coverage Biased?, in RATIONAL READINGS, supra note
14, at 474, 476.
78. 141 CONG. REc. H2278 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Roberts).
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the industry $400 million.79
A fourth example is the ban on asbestos and the removal of asbestos materials
from schools.8' While the removal cost is enormous, there is scientific disagreement
as to whether the removal process itself creates a greater risk of exposure than leaving
the asbestos in place. 1 The EPA responses to Alar and asbestos were both seen as responses to public pressure rather than reasoned scientific analysis. 2
Besides these specific examples of flawed regulation, many environmental laws
and regulations, arising from different interests and pressures and adopting different
approaches, are overlapping, confusing, and conflicting. 3 The result has been a wide
variation in the amounts of resources expended, or social costs born, in the regulation
of different hazards which provide the same benefits in the reduction of health or
ecological risk. For instance, in terms of social costs, the estimated costs in dollar
amounts per premature death averted range from a modest $200,000 for the achievement of trihalomethane standards in drinking water to an extreme $5.7 billion for the
listing of wood preservative chemicals as hazardous waste.8 Even given the uncertainty in these estimates, such a disparity indicates an inefficient allocation of scarce
resources.
Of course, many additional factors may go into the decision to regulate a particular hazard at a particular time, and it is impossible to say that a disparity between any
two specific regulations is the direct result of the factors listed above and no others. It
may even be questionable to use such dollar comparisons as a measure of efficiency or
value of a regulation. Nevertheless, these types of comparisons solidify the convictions
of those who believe that many regulations are unnecessarily burdensome and harmful

79. Id.

80. The Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-2656 (1994),
requires school administrations to inspect schools for asbestos hazards and develop response plans to
mitigate hazards, possibly including removal.
81.

Lester B. Lave, Health and Safety Risk Analyses: Information for Better Decisions, 236 Sci.

291, 292 (1987).
The probability of children getting mesothelioma or lung cancer from such asbestos
exposure in school is estimated to be about five per million lifetimes, less than
1/5000 the chance of death faced by these children from other current events in their
lives ....
Careless removal of asbestos, however, can pose major risks to the workmen as well as to the children; many experts believe that asbestos in good repair
ought to be left in place and removed only when there is a major renovation or a
building is demolished.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Malcolm Ross, Minerals and Health: The Asbestos Problem, in
RATIONAL READINGS, supra note 14, at 101, 110.

82. 141 CONG. REC. H2258 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Brown).
83. An example is the conflict between TSCA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(1976 Amendments to the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992 (West 1995
& Supp. July 1996), also known as RCRA). Congress applied both of these statutes to regulate the
disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). However, the statutory schemes have different requirements, which cause administrative difficulties. TSCA regulations established a separate permitting
system for incinerators and landfills for PCB disposal. While some RCRA-permitted disposal facilities
may have the technological capability to dispose of PCB's in accordance with TSCA requirements, they
would have to go through a separate approval process before they could accept PCB's for disposal.
This creates greater expense and deterrence to providers of PCB disposal facilities. See OFFICE OF
TECH. ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL

92-93 (1983).

84. Vernon R. Rice, Regulating Reasonably, ENVTL. F., May/June 1994, at 16, 23.
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to business and the economy.'

M. THE CURRENT STATE OF RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK
MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGIES
Risk assessment and risk management are proposed as methods to scientifically
evaluate the true nature of potential environmental harms, and rationally and efficiently
direct resources to protect the public from the greatest risks to health and welfare. The
EPA itself has been a strong proponent of risk assessment in certain areas as a "scientific" way to promote realistic, objective, and balanced regulation. 6 Whether these
tools in their present state can effectively achieve these goals in a broader application
depends on the applicability of the methodologies which have been developed thus far.
A. Steps in Applying Risk Assessment
Risk assessment methodologies may vary from application to application, but
similarities exist. The general methodology is usually described as having four steps,
with similar functions in each application. These steps are hazard identification, expo87
sure pathway assessment, dose-response assessment, and risk characterization.
Risk itself is defined generically as a compound measure of the probability and
magnitude of an adverse effect. It contains components relating to both the likelihood
of a harm occurring and the extent of its consequences." The extent of harm may be
defined as an increased incidence of premature deaths or illnesses among populations,
an increased likelihood of illness or death for an individual, an expected number of
years of shortened lifespan, a lifetime loss of earnings potential, or other measures.
The basic purpose of expressing risk is to quantify the potential environmental harm to
be incurred or avoided by implementation of a specific policy or regulation.'
Hazard identification is the first phase in the process of assessing risk. This
requires identifying the agent in the environment which may cause harm and assessing
the evidence which associates exposure to the agent with the resulting harm.' ° Such
evidence may come from epidemiological studies, animal studies, studies based upon

85. Id. at 16.
86. Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19 HARV. ENvTL.
L. REv. 409, 412 (1995) (citing EPA RISK AssEssMENT COUNCIL, GUIDANCE FOR RISK ASSESSMENT 4

(Nov. 1991)).
87. This is the nomenclature I have adopted as representative of various descriptions in the literature. Regardless of the nomenclature used, functions of the four steps are very similar in the implementation of risk assessment in different applications. See, for example, the methodology outlined in
Milton Russell & Michael Gruber, Risk Assessment in Environmental Policy Making, 236 Sci. 286, 286

(1987), concerning the regulation of toxic chemicals. Compare the model of risk assessment in

CHARLES A. WENTz, HAZARDOUs WAsTE MANAGEMENT 21-22 (1989), involving designation of hazard-

ous waste.
In assessing the hazard due to contaminated sites regulated under RCRA and CERCLA, the
EPA includes a fifth step which involves analyzing the effects of variability and uncertainty in the
other steps of the audit. In other approaches, this is done in the risk characterization step. See David
E. Burmaster & Jeanne W. Appling, Introduction to Human Health Risk Assessment, with an Emphasis

on Contaminated Properties, 25 Envt. Rep. (BNA) 2431, 2432 fig.2 (Apr. 7, 1995).
88. WILLIAM W. LOwRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK 70 (1976).

89. A more narrow definition of risk is the magnitude of the harm times its probability of occurrence. Technically, this is the expected value (or expected cost) of the adverse effect. This is a useful
definition and often is what is effectively used in practice. However, it is too narrow as a generic
definition, particularly in cases where actual probabilities are too uncertain to quantify. See EDMUND A.
C. CROUCH & RICHARD WILSON, RISK/BENEFrr ANALYSIS 9-11 (1982).
90. Russell & Gruber, supra note 87, at 286.
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the effects of a harmful agent on human or animal cells in vitro, or comparison with
known effects of a related harmful agent with a similar chemical structure.9 It may
also require consideration of circumstances or conditions present which affect the
potential for harm to people or the environment.' In general, this step outlines the
nature and extent of the hazard to be addressed.93
The second step, exposure pathway assessment, analyzes the pathways by which
a harmful agent may migrate from its source to a receptor, such as a person.' A
source may be a hazardous waste landfill, a pesticide applied to a food crop, or a
nuclear power plant. In cases of toxic chemicals, the pathway may include actual entry
mechanisms such as inhalation, ingestion, or skin contact,9 whereas in harmful agents
such as radiation, it may involve simple exposure. If there is no barrier to prevent an
exposure, by either the agent moving to the receptor or the receptor moving into contact with the agent, it is a complete pathway.9" If no complete pathways exist, there
can be no exposure and no risk related to the source.' Exposure pathway assessment
may also require the estimation of the dose which may be delivered along the
9
pathway. 8
The third step, dose-response assessment, attempts to quantify the harmful effect
which a delivered exposure to a certain quantity of a harmful agent may have on the
receptor. 99 In addition to dosage, which measures the intensity of exposure, the doseresponse assessment must account for frequency and duration of exposure. With many
agents, large doses over a short period can be less harmful than low doses over a long

91. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR DETERMINING CANCER RISKS FROM THE ENVIRONMENT 113 (1981).

92. For example, in toxic site assessment, the determination of extent and depth of contamination
is part of the hazard identification step. Burmaster & Appling, supra note 87, at 2432.
93. Id.

94. Id. at 2434.
95. Id. at 2435.
96. Id. at 2434.
97. Id.
98. Id.

99. The evaluation of the response to a given dose of a harmful agent will depend on how the
dose is defined. There are three common ways to characterize dose: exposure dose, absorbed dose, and
biologically effective dose (BED). In toxic chemical exposure, for example, exposure dose measures the
total weight of chemical entering the body through an exposure pathway, without regard to how much
may be eliminated from the body without being metabolized and absorbed. Id. at 2435. Absorbed dose
is the amount of chemical which is absorbed and metabolized, and is always smaller than the exposure
dose. Id. BED is the amount that may reach a sensitive organ and cause actual biological damage. Id.
Exposure dose is most frequently encountered since it is usually easiest to measure.
The proper definition of dosage is important in characterizing risk to a population in a scientifically sound manner. A vague or incorrect definition of dosage may lead to improper assessment of
risk and subsequent poor decision-making. This is evident in the measurement of dosage for radiation
exposure, which mirrors the distinction in chemical exposure. Radiation exposure is measured in Roentgen units, which measure the total energy which an ionizing radiation can deliver to an object by
passing through it, whether or not it is absorbed. Radiation absorbed by an object is expressed in rads
(radiation absorbed dose), which measure the ionizing energy actually absorbed by the object. The dose
equivalent is expressed in reins (Roentgen equivalent in man), to account for the fact that different
types of radiation which deliver the same ionizing energy to an object may produce different biological
effects. The dose equivalent for a certain type of radiation is found by multiplying the absorbed dose
in rads by the Relative Biological Effectiveness (RBE) factor. The RBE for x-rays and electrons is 1,
for slow neutrons is 5, and for alpha radiation is 20. Since the dose equivalent measures the actual
biological effect on the human body, limits on occupational exposure to radiation are expressed in
reins, and this is the exposure which must be measured and tracked for persons working in a radiation
environment. See DAVID HALLIDAY & ROBERT RESNICK, FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICS 1089-90 (1988).
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time period."°° Risk assessment in environmental policy therefore tends to be less
concerned with acute, short-term effects, and focuses more on chronic exposures over
periods ranging from one year to a lifetime. 1' However, high, short-term exposures
may still present serious health risks which can affect the response assessment."
The dosage response itself is usually expressed in terms of risk similar to those
previously discussed, e.g., shortened life expectancy, increased incidence of cancer
above background levels, or similar harm, in response to a given exposure at a given
frequency over a given duration. Uncertainties in the dose-response relationship arise
from many sources: variations in response from person to person, differences in response between humans and experimental animal subjects, and uncertainties in knowing the maximum safe exposure level to an agent.'03
The fourth step of the risk assessment process, risk characterization, combines
the information in the previous steps to quantitatively define the overall health risk due
to the source in terms of magnitude and likelihood."°4 Depending on the type of risk
being analyzed, the "output" of this step may be expressible in numerical terms, such
as a total hazard index or an incremental lifetime cancer risk due to use or presence of
a certain chemical. 5 For less easily quantifiable risks, the characterization may present a description of possible effects or scenarios and their likelihoods. This step should
also describe for the risk manager the major assumptions used in the assessment and
the remaining uncertainties which cannot be easily quantified. 6
B. Problems in Applying Risk Assessment
While these methods help to improve the understanding of the true nature of the
harm presented by an environmental agent, and can help to shape regulatory responses
and programs, their use as predominant decision-making tools raises some fundamental
concerns. Many scientists question whether the state of scientific knowledge is sufficiently advanced to support the guidelines which have been developed even in areas
where risk assessment methodology has been applied, such as carcinogen risk assessment."° Some see it by its very nature as a "limited methodology" that was developed in the context of hazardous chemical exposure, and not suitable in its present
state of development to be pushed beyond this application."5 In fact, the EPA has

100. Burmaster & Appling, supra note 87, at 2435.
101. Id.
102. Id.

103. These uncertainties are often handled by setting a "reference dose" (RfD) level at a level

somewhere below the lowest dosage known to produce the harmful effects. Id. at 2432. This lowest
dosage, known as the Lowest Observed Adverse Affects Level or LOAEL, is often divided by 10 to
arrive at the RID. Id. at 2432-33.
A different approach is taken for carcinogens, which are assumed to have no safe exposure
level. For these substances, the response is assumed to be a linear relationship between the lowest observed dosage which produces an effect, and zero dosage. This relationship is called the cancer slope
factor (CSF) and is used to estimate human response to a carcinogen at low exposure levels. Id. at
2433.
104. Note that a statistical element is present in all three previous phases of the risk assessment
methodology. Statistical treatment may be appropriate in the hazard identification step (probability of a
release), the pathway assessment (probability of propagation along a pathway), and dose-response assessment (probability and magnitude of harm resulting from a given exposure).
105. Burmaster & Appling, supra note 87, at 2436.
106. Russell & Gruber, supra note 87, at 286.
107. Id. at 287.
108.

Paul A. Locke, Regulatory Reform and the Myth of "Realistic Risk," ENvTL. F., Jan./Feb.
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found it difficult to perform rigorous quantitative risk assessments outside of cancer
risks."° Even within this context, risk assessment in its present state is inadequate to
analyze the interrelated effects of multiple chemical exposure, or the effects of other
biological factors.'
Another concern is that, since the methods rely heavily on the use of statistical
analysis and inference, they are subject to the assumptions and requirements of statistical methods in general. The application of statistical methods requires, either explicitly
or implicitly, the construction of statistical models."' Different models may give
widely varying statistical results from the same data, and the validity of the result
depends on how well the assumed model reflects the real world." 2
Reliable statistical analysis also requires a sufficient quantity of data to make
meaningful tests within acceptable limits of error. When risk analysis attempts to evaluate a health effect which has a very low incidence of occurrence in the population, it
is often very difficult to obtain an adequate sample size or other data sufficient to
support an inference.'
When the low incidence of occurrence of a certain harm is coupled with the
potential for catastrophic damage, it leads to the risk assessment problem known as the
"zero-infinity" dilemma. This problem relates to certain environmental hazards which
have common characteristics that magnify the dangers of a threat in the public perception. It complicates and often politicizes the task of the agency responsible for regulating them. The four characteristics are: a poorly understood mechanism by which the
harm operates, a potentially catastrophic cost, a relatively modest benefit, and a very
low subjective probability of occurrence of the harm." 4 Examples of such risks are
nuclear power accidents, exposure to certain toxic chemicals, and atmospheric ozone
depletion."' The extreme example is the "zero-infinity" case: a threat which has a
negligible chance of occurrence, but overwhelmingly catastrophic consequences. The

1995, at 35.
109. PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 660.
110. Id.
111. CROUCH & WILSON, supra note 89, at 52.
112. THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK CONTROL 26 (1985).
113. There are two basic sources of error when evaluating a proposed hypothesis through statistical
analysis. These are the erroneous rejection of a hypothesis when it is true and the erroneous retention
of a hypothesis when it is false and should be rejected. The smaller the sample size in the analysis,
the greater the probability for each type of error, all other factors being equal. Cf JAY L. DEvORE,
PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS-FOR ENGINEERING AND THE SCIENCES 280-87 (1987).
In addition to the large amount of data required for valid hypothesis testing, there are other
common problems in the application of statistical analysis to the environmental area. These include the
possibilities of large measurement errors, missing or suspected values in the data set, data values close
to or below the detectable limits of measurement, the need to measure more than one variable at a
time, complicated cause-effect relationships, and complex trends in data over time or distance. RICHARD
0. GILBERT, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION MONITORING 3 (1987).
114. Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207,
208-09 (1978).
115. Id. at 208. Not all the characteristics are equally prominent in each type of risk. For example,
the benefits of nuclear power may not be modest, but they may be perceived to be relatively modest
in comparison to the potential harm. On the other hand, the benefit from the use of a food coloring
agent may be very modest compared to the risk of carcinogenicity. Similarly, the causes of a nuclear
accident may be better understood than the mechanism of action of a carcinogen, though as the ThreeMile Island disaster showed, the scenario leading up to a nuclear accident can be unpredictable. See
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, THE NEED FOR CHANGE: THE
LEGACY OF TMI 27-33 (1979).
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uncertainties involved in dealing with such an issue are so great that the agency is
unable to make any quantitative assessment of the harms and benefits. An agency is
then forced to either ignore the possibility in its analysis or make an arbitrary judg16
ment that even a negligible risk will not be tolerated.
A reliance on risk assessment as a predominant decision tool also raises some of
the concerns of "single purpose planning" raised in objection to the cost-benefit approach described supra. By focusing on human health and efficient allocation of resources, the methodology may ignore or derogate other important ecological principles.
Finally, some critics maintain that scientific principles cannot take the place of values
and equity in policy and decision-making." 7
C. The Function of Risk Management
Ideally, risk assessment provides a scientific and quantitative measure of the
potential for harm to human health or the environment from a particular problem. Risk
management is the process of using this information to make decisions, set priorities,
and communicate the results to affected stakeholders. Risk management must take into
account the economic, political, social, cultural, and perceptual factors which surround
the problem.' It must also take note of the limitations on action imposed by statutes, budgetary constraints, political realities, lack of complete information, and uncertainties in what is known.
Risk management may include the use of cost-benefit analysis in setting regulatory policy when costs and benefits can be adequately quantified. However, when the
benefit is in terms of health or longevity, this leaves many people uncomfortable with
what seems to be the placing of a dollar figure on the value of preventing a premature
death, or some similar approach." 9 The more productive use of risk assessment by an
agency may be in setting priorities for its internal actions, or in using the results to
influence the setting of priorities which are externally imposed."2 Comparisons of
risks for various options and alternatives can lead to the greatest reduction in total risk
for a certain expenditure level.1 '
The other common use of risk management has been to design regulations, in
terms of deciding which harms to address and how stringent a level of control to apply." When a particular harmful agent may be introduced into the environment by
various pathways, and these different mechanisms may have widely different impacts
in terms of magnitude and likelihood, comparative risk assessment can shape the regu-

. 116. The first approach was taken by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in assessing the
impact of a class nine (breach of reactor containment) nuclear disaster. Its exclusion of this impact
from the EIS was upheld in Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796
(D.C. Cir. 1975). The second approach is exemplified by the Delaney clause of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3) (1994), prohibiting the use of any food additive which
shows evidence of carcinogenicity in animals.
117. For example, the equitable sharing of risks may be as important a principle as the
minimization of risks. See David Clarke, Looking at Risk, ENVTL. F., MarJApr. 1991, at 12, 16.
118. WENTZ, supra note 87, at 22.
119. See David Corn, Benefits Package, 260 THE NATION 441, 442 (1995) (.'Do we really want
to take as our model E.P.A.'s estimate, in doing its cost-benefit analysis of cutting lead levels in
drinking water, that each lowered I.Q. point costs a child $4,588 in lost earnings?"') (quoting testimony
of Carl Pope, executive director, Sierra Club, on H.R. 1022).
120. Russell & Gruber, supra note 87, at 287.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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lations to place priority on the most severe risks. This can improve the efficiency of
regulation and minimize economic and social costs to the regulated entities and the
consuming public. 23
Beyond decision-making and setting of priorities, an important function of risk
management is to adequately communicate the knowledge about risks which risk assessment produces. This communication function has two dimensions. The first is to
inform policy makers of the risk-related effects of their policy choices and selections
among alternatives. This will aid them in determining what level of risk is acceptable
and which alternatives will provide an adequate level of safety."n
The second dimension is to communicate realistic risk information to the public
concerning the policy choices being made. It is important in this undertaking that the
public should recognize that no choice can eliminate all risk."2 Using the results of
risk assessment, the presentation can include comparisons which indicate the true severity of risk associated with each policy alternative. However, mere comparisons, if
not carefully presented, can manipulate the public perception and be misleading. 2
To avoid this result, the presentation should express risks in a familiar context and
provide some indication of the uncertainties involved in the assessment process. It
should also be sensitive to public concerns by including non-quantitative information
on such factors as voluntariness, catastrophic potential, familiarity, and controllability.
These factors can be realistically incorporated in a proper application of risk assessment.
D. Problems in Applying Risk Management

The challenge to successful risk management is to be able to express the risks
associated with a given environmental problem in terms that are understandable and
credible to both decision-makers and the public. When the public perception of a threat
is distorted or inaccurate, due to insufficient information, inadequate understanding, or
misguided attitudes, the quality of legislation designed to address the threat is likely to
suffer.
The level of public concern over a specific problem, particularly one that involves a direct harm to health, often depends on both the perceived risk and the level
of acceptable risk related to that harm. Both the degree of perceived risk and the degree of risk that an ordinary person is willing to find acceptable in a given situation
may vary greatly from that of an expert risk assessor. Risk perceptions of the ordinary
person are influenced by characteristics of the hazard, including familiarity, knowledge,
catastrophic potential, and degree of control by the individual.'27 This perception is
for most people an intuitive judgment based on their experience with the particular

123. Id.
124. Id. at 288.
125. CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, supra note 112, at 5.
126. Paul Slovic et al., Informing People About Riskin BANBURY REPORT 6: PRODUCT LABELUNG
AND HEALTH RISKS 165, 170-75 (L. Morris et al. eds., 1980), reprinted in JUDITH AREEN ET AL.,
LAW, SCIENCE, AND MEDICINE 711-13 (1984).
127. Research has shown that, for the ordinary person, risk perceptions and risk acceptance are
influenced by family, friends, co-workers, and public figures. Risk attitudes may even be formed after
an experience with a particular hazard as a rationalization for earlier behavior. Once formed, risk attitudes are difficult to change even in the face of evidence. Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCI.
280, 281 (1987).
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hazard, which often is through news media coverage.' Risk acceptance is strongly
related to the perceived benefit of the activity and to the degree of voluntariness of the
exposure.129
As a result of the interactions among these factors, the public tends to be concerned with environmental threats that experts would rank relatively low as a health
risk, and vice versa. For example, surveys indicate that public concern is highest with
respect to active arid abandoned hazardous waste sites, even though experts believe
these to be small health risks."3 The public attitude is not surprising given the involuntary nature of exposure due to a release from a hazardous waste site and its catastrophic potential. On the other.hand, while experts rate both outdoor and indoor air
pollution as high health risks, these threats, especially indoor air pollution, rank lower
in public concern.' This is probably due to familiarity and perceived lack of catastrophic potential, since health effects from air pollution tend to arise only from longterm exposure.'
E. EDB: A Case Study in the Application of Risk Assessment and Risk
Management
The history of the regulation of EDB in the 1980s is a good illustration of the
application of risk assessment and risk management methodologies in environmental
regulation, as well as some of the inherent problems. The initial data which indicated
carcinogenic potential for EDB came from clinical laboratory studies on animals. The
studies showed an increased cancer risk associated with the three entry pathways of
"gavage [forced feeding], inhalation, and skin painting."'3 Human exposure pathways were identified by way of dietary exposure through fruit and uncooked grain
products which had been treated with EDB, and later through groundwater contamination which affected drinking water supplies.'35
Initially the EPA modeled the dosage risk based on the "one-hit" model, which
resulted in a high risk estimate from exposure, both for agricultural workers and the
public. 3 ' Criticism of this model as unrealistic'37 led the EPA to modify its assessment by calculating differential risks for different age groups from adjusted exposure
durations. The model was still considered conservative, having adopted a linear lowdose-response relationship, and its risk estimate was considered an upper-bound
risk. "' This risk still appeared to be high, however, and led the EPA in 1983 to cancel registration of EDB as a soil fumigant.'39 The EPA proposed cancellation as a
128. Id. at 280.
129. Some research indicates that a person may be willing to accept a risk from a voluntary activity up to 1000 times greater than that from an involuntary exposure which provides the same benefit.
Id. at 282.
130. PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 662 fig.5.1.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 757.
133. Russell & Gruber, supra note 87, at 288.
134. Improvements in detection methods made possible the detection of EDB residues in food
products which previously had shown no trace of EDB. See WENTZ, supra note 87, at 25.
135. Russell & Gruber, supra note 87, at 288.
136. Id.
137. For a description of the "one-hit" model and a challenge to the "no threshold" theory of carcinogens, see Thomas H. Jukes, Chasing a Receding Zero: Impact of the Zero Threshold Concept on
Actions of Regulatory Officials, in RATIONAL READINGS, supra note 14, at 329, 329-33 (1992).

138. Russell & Gruber, supra note 87, at 288.
139. Intent to Cancel Registration of Pesticide Products Containing Ethylene Dibromide, 48 Fed.
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fruit and grain fumigant by 1984."4
By this time, public interest in the hazard had become very strong,141 and many
states were adopting stringent safety standards for EDB residues in food which would
have required destruction of a large amount of existing grain-based food inventories." This destruction would have caused severe economic dislocation and provided
a .questionable public health benefit. To avoid this, the EPA used risk assessment to
determine which existing food supplies represented an acceptable health risk and which
should be destroyed. The assessment indicated that dietary exposure from soil fumigation and grain fumigation represented the highest public risks, in the range of 1 in
10,000 to 1 in 1,000,000 increased cancer risk resulting from lifetime exposure. 43
However, risk from consuming existing food supplies over a relatively short period of
time was found to be low enough that destruction was not necessary.1" As a result,
the EPA suspended most uses of EDB, but did not order destruction of existing
foodstocks. The risk assessment also prioritized the dangers by severity of the risk,
with groundwater contamination presenting the greatest risk, followed by grain
products, then fruit. 45
The use of risk assessment allowed a more orderly removal of EDB from the
environment than would have otherwise occurred, and prevented the severe waste
which would have resulted from destruction of existing food stocks. However, while
the methodology limited the influences of misguided risk perceptions and political
decisions on the process, it did not eliminate them, and in many ways the process was
still driven by the pressures of media attention and public apprehension. Nor did the
EPA action satisfy critics on both sides of the issue."4
This history of EDB regulation is not necessarily a typical or exemplary application of risk assessment and risk management, but it does illustrate two things. First, it
is a concrete example of the use of risk assessment principles in the type of application
to which they are well suited. Second, it shows that, despite the application of these
sound scientific principles in their present state of development, political and perceptual factors may still have a significant influence on the process.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION: THE RISK ASSESSMENT AND COST
BENEFIT ACT OF 1995

Despite the inherent problems, the movement continues toward increased reliance
on risk assessment and risk management as a way to improve the uniformity, efficiency, and accountability of environmental regulation. The Risk Assessment and Cost

Reg. 46,234 (1983).

140. Id.
141. Charlotte Low, Pressure Mounts for New EDB Standards, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 14, 1984, at 5.
142. Bill Abrams, Six States Plan to Exceed U.S. on EDB Curbs, WALL ST. I., Feb. 24, 1984, at

8.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Russell & Gruber, supra note 87, at 288.
Id.
Id.
See Philip Shabecoff, Administration's Action on EDB Does Not Satisfy Critics, L.A. DAILY J.,

Feb. 7, 1984, at 4 (describing objections by consumer groups that the action left known carcinogens in
the food supply); The EDB Flakeout, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1984, at 32 (claiming the ban was premature). See also George Miller, Federal Callousness and EDB, L.A. DAILY J., March 12, 1984, at 4

(criticizing OSHA for failing to set occupational exposure limits to EDB following the EPA suspension).
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Benefit Act of 1995147 (hereinafter the Act) seeks to impose the methodologies of
risk assessment and risk management onto the decision-making processes of regulatory
agencies.
The purpose of the Act is "[t]o provide regulatory reform and to focus national
economic resources on the greatest risks to human health, safety, and the environment . . . ."'" It calls for setting regulatory priorities based on "scientifically sound,
objective, and unbiased risk assessments, comparative risk analysis, and risk management choices that are grounded in cost-benefit principles."149 The Act also states that
"improvements are needed in both the quality of assessments and the characterization
'
and communication of findings[,] 'lSO
and that "public stake holders must be fully involved in the risk-decision making process."'' The Act thus seeks to improve both
the scientific validity of governmental regulation and the involvement and understanding of the affected public.
A. Risk Assessment and Communication
Title I defines the scope of the Act and outlines the principles of risk assessment
and risk management which it mandates for regulatory agencies. The Act applies to
specifically listed federal agencies and to other agencies which may be designated by
the President.' It requires risk assessment and risk management studies to be undertaken for any major rule' promulgated by a covered agency "to protect human
health, safety or the environment,"''" any environmental cleanup plan under the Solid
Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) or CERCLA,'55 and any listing of a hazardous substance or carcinogen. 6
The Act spells out principles to be applied in risk assessment and risk management proposals. These include, inter alia: a focus on a "biological basis to assume a
resulting harm in humans[;]"' 57 the presentation of "plausible and alternative assumptions, inferences, or models;"' 58 providing the "best estimate or estimates" of risk for

147. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. (1995).

148. Id. preamble.
149. Id. § 2(3).
150. Id. § 2(4).
151. Id. § 2(5).
152. Covered federal agencies are the EPA, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the Department of Energy (DOE), The Department of the Interior (DOI), the Department of Agriculture
(DOA), the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), the Mine Safety
and Health Administration (MSHA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and other agencies
which the President, acting through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), determines should
be covered. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 110(5) (1995).
153. A "major rule" is defined as any regulation which is likely to result in an increase in cost,
direct or indirect, to either the private or public sector, of $25,000,000 or more. However, it does not
include any regulations or actions which authorize or approve an individual substance or product. Id.
§ 5(3).
154. Id. § 103(b)(2)(b)(i).
155. Id. § 103(b)(2)(b)(ii) (The Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) is codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 6901-6992 (West 1995 & Supp. July 1996)).
156. Id. § 103(b)(2)(v).
157. Id. § 104(b)(1).
158. Id. § 104(b)(2)(A).
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specific populations or resources;" 9 explanations of exposure scenarios;" ° and comparisons of estimated risks with other familiar risks "routinely encountered by the
general public ... ."161
The Act recognizes that any risk assessment exercise requires the selection of
statistical models as well as reliance upon assumptions and inferences. It therefore
requires each covered agency to report to Congress concerning the policy or value
judgments upon which it bases its assumptions and model selection." With this provision, Congress apparently intends to maintain close supervision over the policy decisions and value judgments of the agencies.
The Act also provides for training and research in risk assessment methodologies. It authorizes the head of each covered agency to evaluate and implement research
and training needs for the agency.' It also authorizes the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), in conjunction with the National Research Council, to conduct a study
and provide common risk assessment and risk management guidelines to Congress and
the covered agencies.'"
Despite its purpose in attempting to found all major decision-making in risk
assessment and cost benefit principles, Title I contains a "saving clause" which preserves any existing statutory standard or requirement "designed to protect health, safety, or the environment."'" How this saving provision will interact with the other provisions of the Act and with the purposes of other environmental statutes is one of the
major uncertainties in the effect of this legislation.'" Presumably, it will preserve the
risk assessment guidelines presently in force in the Superfund Act. Whether it will
preserve a more stringent criterion, such as the rigid feasibility standard for a health
regulation under OSHA, is less clear.
B. Risk Reduction Benefits and Costs
Title II of the Act describes the mechanisms by which regulatory agencies are to
implement the principles outlined in Title I. The bill generally requires that covered
federal agencies should, to the extent feasible, base major decisions on scientifically
based risk assessments. The heart of the bill is its provision for decision criteria. It
requires that any final rule of an agency be based on "scientific and economic evaluations of all significant and relevant information and risk assessments provided to the
agency[,]' 67 and that this decision criteria "shall supplement and, to the extent there
is a conflict, supersede the decision criteria for rule making otherwise applicable under
the statute pursuant to which the rule is promulgated."'6 8 Thus the bill provides a
"supermandate" to override decision criteria of existing laws.
The Act directs the OMB to guide the agencies in the implementation of these

159. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 105(I)(A) (1995).
160. Id. § 105(2).
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Id. § 105(3).
Id. § 107(b).
Id. § 108(b).
H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 109(a) (1995).
Id. § 103(c).

166. See Risk Assessment and Cost/Benefit Analysis for New Regulations: Hearings on H.R. 9
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials and the Subcomm. on Health
and Environment, House Comm on Commerce, 104th Cong. 4 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
167. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 202(a)(1) (1995).

168. Id. § 202(b)(1).
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requirements, including "any new requirements or procedures needed to supplement
prior agency practice[,]"' 69 and generally places the development of risk and costbenefit analysis methodology under the control of the OMB."' The Act provides special rules for environmental cleanup plans, defining any cleanup plan for which costs
are likely to exceed $5,000,000 as a "major rule," and making it specifically subject to
the decision criteria of the Act."' This provision will likely subject most cleanup
proposals under the Superfund Act to the mandates of risk assessment and cost-benefit
analysis.
C. Peer Review
Title III of the Act requires the head of each covered agency to develop a peer
review program for the agency's regulatory activities. The program is to create peer
review panels, made up of experts from industry, public interest and environmental
groups, state and local governments, universities, and other interested parties."
These panels are to review the risk assessment and/or cost analysis which forms the
basis for any proposed rule which is expected to have a cost impact of $100,000,000
or more per year, and to review any other significant risk assessment designated by the
Director of the OMB.' The peer review panels are to report on the scientific and
economic merit of the analysis method and the data used. 74
The Act intends the inclusivity of the peer review panels to cover representatives
of the regulated industries. It provides that the panels "shall not exclude peer reviewers
with substantial and relevant expertise merely because they represent entities that may
have a potential interest in the outcome, provided that interest is fully disclosed to the
agency .... ""'5 This provision meets some of the criticism that regulated entities
have too little participation in the decision process. However, when the rule under
consideration applies to a single entity, the Act forbids a representative of that entity
from being on a peer review panel.
D. Judicial Review
Title IV of the Act provides for judicial review of covered agency actions. It
grants to any court that has jurisdiction to review an agency action under an enabling
statute the concurrent jurisdiction to review the agency's compliance with this Act.'"
It directs the court to treat any agency action as unlawful if the risk assessment and
characterization documents do not comply with the Act's requirements. One of the
most far-reaching effects of the provision for judicial review is the standard of review
it imposes, as it requires that the covered agencies must "substantially comply" with

169. Id. § 203(1).
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Id. § 203(2).
Id. § 204.
Id. § 301(a)(1).
H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 301(b) (1995).
Id. § 301(c).
Id. § 301(a)(3).
Id.

177. Id. § 401. The Act does not provide an independent basis for federal court jurisdiction to
review an agency action. Instead it provides to any court which has jurisdiction to review an agency
action, under either the statute which created the agency authority or the Administrative Procedures
Act, jurisdiction to review that same action for compliance with this Act.
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the risk assessment and risk guidelines spelled out in Title 1.178 This is in contrast to
the discretion which enabling statutes generally confer on regulatory agencies.
E. Plan and Priorities
The remaining titles of the Act require agencies to establish plans for assessing
new information and setting priorities. Title V requires each covered agency to "provide procedures for receiving and considering new information from the public[,]" and
"set priorities and procedures for review, and, where appropriate, revision of ...risk
assessment and risk characterization documents and... health or environmental effects values.""x The proponents thus intend to keep the review process ongoing for
regulatory rules promulgated under the risk assessment guidelines and cost-benefit
guidelines.
Title VI of the Act requires the government to set priorities for reviewing existing regulatory programs as to their cost-effectiveness and the risk benefits they provide." The President is directed to report to Congress every two years to "recommend priorities for modifications to, elimination of, or strategies for existing Federal
regulatory programs designed to protect public health.....
These are the remedial provisions of the Act, designed to implement ongoing
review and correction of existing regulations and programs. The intent is to bring
existing programs into line with risk assessment and cost-benefit principles, according
to the priorities established by the President. Thus, by constant review and revision,
proponents hope to bring a large segment of the regulatory bureaucracy into compliance with the principles embodied in the Act.
V. EFFECT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES
The impact of this reform on present regulatory practices will probably depend
primarily on how completely the "supermandate" provision supplants the decision
criteria in existing environmental statutes with one based on risk assessment and risk
management principles. However, since the risk assessment methodologies which the
Act implements have been developed mainly in the context of human health risks, it
seems clear that the focus of regulatory decisions will shift toward human health issues
and away from other ecological goals such as preservation of wilderness and
biodiversity.
Probably the greatest impact will be on severe command-and-control regulations
such as the ESA." It seems particularly difficult to frame the threat to an endangered species in the terms of risk assessment methodologies, such as hazard identification, etc. However, a superseding decision criterion based on "best estimates of risk" to
a resource would presumably force the EPA to consider the probability of success in
actually preserving a species as well as the risk of extinction before the agency could
list the species as endangered. Applying an objective cost-benefit analysis to the protection of an endangered species will also be difficult since the benefits realized by
preserving a species are much more difficult to quantify than the costs incurred in

178.
179.
180.
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182.

H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 401 (1995).
Id. § 501(a).
Id. § 601(a).
Id. § 601(c).
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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forgoing development. Despite the fact that loss of biodiversity is seen by experts as a
serious ecological risk,' the saving clause may do little to preserve the present
character of the ESA. While this would depend on interpretation of the meaning of a
standard promulgated to protect "the environment," the thrust of the reform is decidedly toward human health and economic efficiency, and away from the ESA's strict ecology principles.
The extent to which this will affect the technology-driven and deadline-based
approaches of the FWPCA and CAA is less clear. The saving clause would presumably prevent an agency from using a risk assessment or cost-benefit analysis to roll
back an existing health or safety standard. But in the promulgation of any new standards based on BAT, the new approach would require greater attention by the agency
to cost and feasibility. Particularly with technology-forcing standards which are forward-looking, such as those relating to continued reduction in auto emissions, the
agency will be forced to quantify the benefit in reduced health risks versus the economic cost to the industry.
In ensuring that the 'development of air and water standards is in substantial
compliance with the Act, the agency will also be forced to deal with the other elements of risk assessment, such as exposure pathways and dosage-response characteristics. Since point source emissions would be subject to further exposure pathway assessment before dosage risks on human receptors can be assessed, the methodology appears better suited to the development of ambient standards than point source limitations. However, given the limited state of scientific knowledge about these elements
outside the contexts of toxicology and carcinogenesis, progress in the development of
new standards may become more difficult. It may be especially difficult to quantify
risks in terms of human populations when the effect of the hazard on human health
and safety is indirect, such as in eutrophication of lakes.'"
While the focus will be increasingly on human health, the reform will also attempt to reduce the social and economic costs of regulation. It may therefore direct
attention to the severe restriction of the Delaney clause on carcinogenic food additives. 8 Since the passage of this clause in 1958, scientists have greatly improved our
ability to quantify the risks associated with exposure to low concentrations of
carcinogens, 186 and thus have provided a basis for risk-benefit assessment. While the
"supermandate" decision criterion of the reform may not be sufficient to override the
explicit language of the Delaney clause, bills have already been introduced to relax its
provisions and permit residues in food that present de minimis risks.8 7 If less stringent standards for food residues do come about, it is probable that risk assessment
methodology will be involved in the comparison of economic benefits to health risks.
However, this may well occur independently of this specific reform.
The reform will probably have less impact on procedural, cost-benefit based
statutes such as NEPA and on incentive-based approaches such as offsets under the

183.

1991 COUNCIL ON ENvTL. QUALITY, TWENTY-FIRST ANN. REP. 146-47.

184. Eutrophication is the process by which the oxygen content of a lake is artificially depleted by
an overload of nutrients. See R.A. BAILEY ET AL., CHEMISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT 319-20 (1978).
Pollutants which lead to eutrophication are nitrates and especially phosphates. Id. at 377.
185. See supra note 116.
186. Richard A. Merrill, Congress as Scientists, ENVT.. F., JanJFeb. 1994, at 20, 23-24.
187. Id. at 20.
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CAA. The proposed bills would mainly add a new dimension to the current environmental assessment procedures under NEPA by increasing the emphasis on
quantification of risks and benefits and emphasizing scientific justifications to support
final decision-making. Nor is there any inherent incompatibility between incentivebased regulation and risk assessment, since risks associated with an incentive approach
can be analyzed as well as with any other approach.
It is unlikely, however, that these bills would provide any hoped-for reduction in
administrative burden that the present statutes impose. If anything, the requirements to
prepare risk assessment and risk characterization documents for environmental regulation programs and EIS's will add another layer of study and analysis, with opportunities for comment and controversy, to an already cumbersome process. With the additional opportunities for peer review and judicial challenge based on a substantial compliance standard, the regulatory process may well become much slower. While some
may welcome the reduced volume of regulation, this may cut both ways by slowing
down the prioritized review and revision of existing programs.'
VI. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION
The purpose of applying the principles of the Act is to avoid the types of unscientific or irrational decisions which have given rise to the need for reform. For example, a scientifically sound risk assessment may have prevented the unwarranted response to the Alar scare."s A sound risk communication program, which gave the
public a true picture of the relative threats to health and the costs and benefits of mitigation, may also have lead to different approaches in the EDB ban"9 or the asbestos
removal program from public schools.' Beyond such obvious benefits, however, the
effectiveness of the bill in providing a thorough reform and improvement of the regulatory process is more difficult to establish.
A. Scientific Drawbacks
A serious problem with the bill is that some of the principles which it requires to
be implemented in the promulgation of regulations either cannot be supported on scientific grounds or lack scientific precision. Proponents of the reform charge that agencies
are too conservative in estimates of risk and develop greatly exaggerated estimates
from relatively insignificant threats to the public."w However, the requirement in section 105(l)(A) that the agency must determine the "best estimate of risk" is not scientifically supportable. Any estimate of risk will depend on the statistical model used to
develop it, and there is no scientific definition of "best estimate" of risk.'93 The definition of "best estimate of risk" then becomes a policy issue. These definitions of risk
will also depend on the relevant population which is selected for application of the
statistical model. The fear is that, by dictating how the agency must define the relevant
population, the bill will limit the discretion agencies now have to protect particularly

188. Risk Assessment and Cost/Benefit Analysis for New Regulations: Hearings on H.R. 9 Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials and the Subcomm. on Health and Environment, House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 4 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
189. See supra text accompanying note 77.
190. See supra text accompanying note 75.
191. See supra text accompanying note 82.
192. Beth Baker, Risk Assessment Kills Bills, 45 BIOScENcE 15 (1995).
193. Richard Stone, Agencies Decry Fuzzy Science in Bill, 267 Sci. 1089, 1090 (1995).
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susceptible populations, such as children who are at risk for lead poisoning."
The Act also fails to distinguish between "theoretical" risk and "actuarial" risk.
While theoretical risks are estimated from statistical models, actuarial risks are determined from the actual frequency of occurrence of a harmful effect in the population.
Agencies tend to use conservative estimates of theoretical risk to ensure protection of
public health. 9 ' If the bill is interpreted to mandate the use of actuarial risk as the
"best estimate" of risk, this margin of safety may be lost.
These problems in definition are one source of unreliability in the use of risk
assessment to set policy and priorities in certain areas of human health and safety.
Even if these difficulties could be resolved, much uncertainty would remain in the
reliability of risk assessment methodologies as a unified approach to environmental
regulation. The scientific methods themselves which are used to identify hazards involve much uncertainty,'96 and many practitioners question whether certainty in these
methods is a realistic goal.' The attempt to quantify and compare risks objectively
ignores the subjective differences which people attach to different classes of risk, such
as voluntary versus involuntary risks. 98 Finally, the overriding focus on human
health issues, while clearly an important goal of environmental policy, ignores ecological risks which may similarly affect the well-being of society.'
B. Policy Drawbacks
While this approach to regulatory reform has significant scientific drawbacks, the
policy implications are even more severe. A fundamental shortcoming of the Act is
that it does not cure the flaws in the underlying environmental statutes themselves
which have caused the regulatory problems, especially the "lack of flexibility to meet
regulations, and the adversarial, litigious nature of the process."2' Nor does the Act
remedy the problem of overlapping and conflicting requirements in some laws and
regulations. The Act instead is a remedial measure which is to be superimposed onto
the existing regulatory structure in an effort to bring the process in line with risk assessment and risk management principles. It generally adds one or more new layers of
analysis, report, commentary, and challenge to each major agency decision, depending
on the expected economic impact. Many people involved in environmental regulation
are not convinced that this will achieve the intended purpose of the bill.2"'
Furthermore, the risk assessment methodology by which the bill attempts to
accomplish this general remedial undertaking was largely developed in the limited

194. Id. at 1089.
195. Tina E. Levine, Assessment and Communication of Risk from Pesticide Residues in Food, 47
FooD & DRUG L.J. 207, 212 (1992).
196. John Carey, So Many Chemicals, So Few Answers, BUS. WK., Mar. 13, 1995, at 98.
197. "Defenses and reforms for risk assessment share a common flaw in failing to account for the
profound uncertainty in the process. When the magnitude of this uncertainty is recognized, risk assessment is properly seen as incapable of generating meaningful information." Shere, supra note 86, at
479-80.
198. Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Number Crunching and Comparative Assessment of Environmental
Risks, 45 BIoSCIENcE 66 (1995).
199. Id.
200. Emily T. Smith et al., Voodoo Regulation?, BUS. WK., Mar. 13, 1995, at 96, 96.
201. "Our concern is that this legislation, in its current form, will undermine these laudatory goals
(of quality science and prioritizing of government resources] by elevating simplistic slogans to unworkable public policy .... " Letter from Carol M. Browner, Administrator, EPA, to Reps. Dingell &
Brown, in 141 CONG. REc. H2334 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1995).
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context of toxic and carcinogen exposure. There is little reliable guidance on how to
apply these methodologies to broader environmental problems such as air and water
quality and protection of biodiversity. In the area of worker safety, the same problem
exists for the development of workplace safety standards outside the areas of toxic or
carcinogenic exposure, for example in the development of industry-wide standards for
safety apparel and work practices. Risk assessment methodologies in their present state
of development may be of such marginal applicability in these areas that they would
provide little improvement in the regulatory scheme.
The Act accommodates this lack of development to a certain extent by setting
forth its "supermandate" on decision criteria in Title II in very general terms, requiring
that agencies base their decisions on "all significant and relevant information and risk
assessments provided to the agency . . . ."' However, this generality is inconsistent
with the "substantial compliance" standard of judicial review provided in Title IV. The
vagueness of the supermandate criteria will make it very difficult for a court to determine what "substantial compliance" is, or what it was intended to be. This can open
up practically any agency action covered under this Act to substantial litigation.
Typically, courts have given great deference to the discretionary authority of
regulatory agencies in promulgating regulations pursuant to the enabling act. The usual
standard has been that courts will uphold regulations that are not arbitrary and capricious.' However, the proponents of this regulatory reform specifically intend to
"substitute[] a substantial evidence test for the arbitrary and capricious test so that the
agencies must really demonstrate to a court that they are complying with the Act's
cost-benefit requirements." 2' Congress clearly intends to limit the traditional discretion which agencies have exercised, and thus assert its own control to a greater extent
in this area of policy. The proponents see judicial review as "one of the key features in
protecting the regulated community, average Americans, from the threat of over regulations and regulations that do not meet the test of good science and cost-benefit analysis."2'° Not surprisingly, opponents of the judicial review provision foresee that it
will impose a great burden on agency action with its procedural requirements"e and
will allow regulated entities to tie up proposed actions in litigation for years.2'
Peer review panels provided in Title III are also controversial. While independent
peer review has long been recognized as an essential element of scientifically sound
risk assessment, its use in the regulatory area has not been widespread." t The proponents of peer review claim that its purpose is to "provide adequate guidance and over-

202. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 202(a)(1) (1995).
203. The Administrative Procedures Act requires a court in review of an agency action to set aside
any action which is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
the law.
... 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1994). Unless an enabling statute requires a higher standard,
courts will not usually impose one judicially. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971).
204. 141 CONG. REc. H2327 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Bilirakas).
205. 141 CONG. REc. H2327 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1995) (remarks of Rep. McIntosh).
206. "The judicial review provision could be called 'The Full Employment Bill for Lawyers and
Lobbyists."' 141 CONG. REC. H.2323 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1993) (remarks of Rep. Roemer).
207. "Any industry that does not like the regulation that comes out of that maze can go into court
and challenge the regulation, tie it up for years. . . . This legislation adds so many procedural requirements, it would allow any industry that opposes a new regulation to delay and litigate the regulation
to death.
... 141 CONG. REc. H2258-59 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Waxman).
208. CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, supra note 112, at 37.
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sight to ensure that these tools are being properly utilized."2' However, the
inclusivity of the peer review panels leads opponents to fear that representatives of
regulated industries will have too much influence on the actions of regulatory agencies
through this process. 2
The other component of the "supermandate" criterion, cost-benefit analysis, also
has its limitations in the environmental area. A true cost-benefit analysis requires the
objective quantification of costs and benefits. However, the quantification of costs and
benefits in government programs, even outside the environmental area, involves many
problems that are not commonly encountered in the private sector.21' These problems
are magnified in the environmental area because the external costs of environmental
harm are so difficult to assess and account for in the analysis. The Act defines "costs"
to include "direct and indirect costs to the United States Government, to State, local,
and tribal governments, and to the private sector, wage earners, consumers, and the
economy" of a particular environmental strategy.212 It defines benefits as the "reasonably identifiable significant health, safety, environmental, social and economic
benefits" that will result from the implementation of the strategy.213 However, the
cost or benefit of an environmental impact depends both on the damage to the environment which is incurred or avoided and the value placed on the affected resources.
Therefore the evaluation of environmental costs is subjective and even somewhat circular.214 Not surprisingly, estimates of the costs and benefits realized in environmental assessments often differ widely and involve wide margins of error. 15 Since direct
costs to the private sector can usually be estimated with more certainty,"' they are
likely to receive greater regard than the more speculative costs of environmental harm.
In its definition of costs and benefits that can be included in the analysis, the Act itself
imposes a higher standard on environmental and health benefits by requiring that they
be "significant." These factors all affect the objectivity and soundness of the methodologies which the Act seeks to impose on covered agencies.
The greatest policy flaw in the Act's imposition of cost-benefit analysis on agency decision-making, however, is that it may frequently conflict with the basic mandates

209. 141 CONG. REc. H2327 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Doyle).
210. "[I]t allows for the corporate insiders, the lobbyists, the scientists, of companies that are, in
fact, with financial interest in the regulation which is being considered, to be able to sit on the peer
review group which is going to be evaluating the risk, that regulation which will be put on the
books." 141 CONG. REc. H2338 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Markey).
211. These include the problem of selecting the viewpoint from which the analysis should be made
(e.g., from the viewpoint of the community as opposed to that of the regulated industry); the problem
of selecting the proper discount rate for determining equivalent values of costs and benefits that occur
at different times; the difficulty in distinguishing costs from disbenefits; and the need for incremental
analysis when more than two alternatives are available. See DONALD G. NEWNAN, ENGINEERING ECoNOMIC ANALYSIS 421-427 (1988).
212. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 5(1) (1995).
213. Id. § 5(2).
214. TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTAUSM 81 (1991).
215. Joseph P. Biniek, Benefit-Cost Analysis: An Evaluation, in CONTROVERSIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 136, 139-140 (Sheldon Kamieniecki et al. eds., 1986).
216. Even the accurate determination of private sector costs is not without difficulties. Some problems in obtaining accurate estimates of costs incurred by industry due to environmental regulation
include the difficulty in determining the differential cost of the pollution control expenditures over
baseline costs, the true cost impact of measures which increase production as well as abate pollution,
the costs of pollution control which are not recognized as such, and the difficulty in separating pollution control costs from related costs such as industrial safety measures. Id. at 144-145.
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of many regulatory schemes to protect human health and safety. When these mandates
exist, they provide a "statutory 'floor"' for necessary regulation, and the agency can
take the cost of compliance into account only if the statutory floor can be met."7 The
Act's general requirement for cost-benefit analysis will undermine the statutory mandate when all adequate regulatory alternatives are costly. In such a situation, the requirement of cost-benefit analysis clearly conflicts with the Act's purpose of focusing
regulatory efforts on human health and safety. The Act provides no guidance on how
to resolve this conflict.
In addition to these shortcomings in the scientific and policy areas, the other
major goal of the bill, the effective communication of risk and cost-benefit comparisons to the public, will likewise prove elusive. In addition to the subjectivity of risk
perceptions by the public and the media, complex comparisons of risk are difficult to
present in a way that the public will understand or believe." 8 Particularly when the
risk quantifications themselves are so highly dependent on the underlying assumptions,
the presentation of risk comparisons, without an understandable explanation of the
assumptions, models, and uncertainties involved, does not provide any sounder basis
for decision-making than would a presentation based on pure policy arguments.1 9
These various criticisms of the bill show how difficult it may be to achieve many
of the stated purposes of the Act. Most of these problems are inherent in the nature of
risk assessment and risk management methodologies. The research and studies of risk
assessment methods which the bill authorizes may lead to many improvements, but
there is no guarantee that they can overcome these problems to a significant degree.
CONCLUSION
If current proposals to increase the use of risk assessment and risk management
in environmental regulation pass the Congress and become law, the results for regulators, regulated entities, and the public are likely to be mixed. These methodologies can
be very powerful and beneficial when they are applied in areas to which they are wellsuited. They can be especially useful in quantifying risks scientifically when an adequate scientific basis is available, in comparing and communicating these identified
risks in a realistic way, in setting priorities, and in directing resources into mitigating
the most severe threats to human health.
When successfully implemented, these techniques should go far in reducing some
of the costly and unprofitable environmental endeavors which were undertaken in the
past without sufficient understanding or justification. Effective and comprehensible
communication of the comparative risks and benefits of major regulatory programs will

217. Letter from Ivan Selin, Chairman, NRC, to Rep. Dingell, in Risk Assessment and Cost/Benefit
Analysis for New Regulations: Hearings on H.R. 9 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and
Hazardous Materials and the Subcomm. on Health and Environment, House Comm. on Commerce,
104th Cong. 6 (1995).
218. "In the midst of controversy concerning EPA risk assessment processes and assumptions, the
Agency must communicate with a public that tends to see things as either 'safe' or 'unsafe'." Levine, supra note 195, at 212. In addition, perceptions of unfairness and helplessness often drive the
public perception of risk in issues that affect public health. Id. (citing Ned Groth, Communicating with
Consumers about Food Safety and Risk Issues, 45 FOOD TECH. 248 (1991)).
219. See Shere, supra note 86, at 475 ("The problem with these and similar reform proposals is
that they assume that the uncertainties are manageable, so that the risk assessment process can continue even if the uncertainties are made explicit. But a risk assessment that acknowledges an uncertainty
of millions or billions of fold would properly be dismissed as useless.").
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also improve the public perception of the process, especially among the members of
the public who are directly regulated.
However, the dependence of these methods on adequate scientific knowledge can
be their Achilles' heel. When an adequate basis does not exist to support their application, the voluminous studies and documents which will be engendered will run the risk
of becoming exercises in futility. They will hamper the ability of agencies to respond
quickly to serious threats unless the agencies can make a convincing case for an emergency. 2 The costs involved in the additional research, review, and study of risk assessment methods and investigations will not be insignificant. And in situations involving the "zero-infinity" dilemma, the lack of quantifiable risks and harms makes these
methods practically useless.
For such reasons, the reforms which are attempting to institute risk assessment to
provide a single unifying approach to environmental regulation are not likely to be
successful. For many of the problems we face, we simply lack the sound theoretical
understanding necessary to perform a meaningful assessment of risks and benefits. Yet
some of these problems are too serious to admit of delay, and we will be unable to
postpone our responses until more knowledge is obtained.
It is true that much of the justification for the early reliance on command-andcontrol regulation no longer exists. These regulations accomplished their goal of focusing the nation's efforts on environmental improvement, and have brought significant
progress. It is therefore possible and desirable to provide more flexibility and economic
sense into new regulations. Agencies have already been directed to begin this process
by executive order.221
The Act, however, attempts to impose a "one size fits all" regulatory scheme on
both present and future environmental statutes.222 The present statutes have been enacted in response to widely differing problems, involving complex circumstances and
facing varying political, social, and economic climates. There is no reason to believe
that future statutes will face a less diverse set of situations. This attempt to force these
broadly different problems into the same mold may easily result in much of the same
inconsistency, conflict, and inefficiency that has plagued environmental policy since its
inception.
Few would argue against the proposition that a better approach to regulation
would be to cure the defects in the underlying legislation which have brought us to our
present condition. This can be accomplished to some extent by executive order, and to

220. The Act provides that it does not apply to "[a] situation that the head of an affected agency
determines to be an emergency. In such circumstances, the head of the agency shall comply with the
provisions of this Act within as reasonable a time as is practical." H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. § 3(1)
(1995). While this provision appears to contradict itself, its probable intent is to allow an agency to
promulgate a major rule in an emergency situation without performing a risk assessment, but require
the agency to follow up with a risk assessment within a reasonable time.
221. Many of the principles embodied in H.R. 1022 are contained in the executive order. Agencies
have been directed to "examine whether existing regulations (or other law) have created or contributed
to the problem that a new regulation is intended to correct, and whether those regulations (or other
law) should be modified[,]" to "consider, to the extent reasonable, the degree and nature of risks posed
by various substances or activities within its jurisdiction[J" and to "assess both the costs and the
benefits of the intended regulation, and . . . propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs." Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,735 (1993).
222. 141 CONG. REc. H2270 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Manton).
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a greater extent by careful and rational revision of existing statutes. The attempt to
force the use of risk assessment and cost-benefit methodologies in situations to which
they are not well suited, and to limit the traditional discretion of agencies to respond to
complex or unforeseen problems, may in the long run have an adverse effect on the
goal of protecting human health and safety. It will almost certainly do harm to our
broader environmental and ecological values.
The proponents of risk assessment and risk management should recognize its
limitations as well as its benefits. While we should implement these methods to their
fullest potential where they are effective, we should keep other options available when
different approaches are needed.
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